I NTRODUCTION
In the 'late 1980s, a series of well-publicized defense contractor abuses brought the ordinarily obscure topic of government contracting into the public eye.1 These abuses included not only instances of seemingly wasteful charges, like the infamous $600 toilet seat, ap proved by a complicit Department of Defense,2 but also examples of truly fraudulent activity such as knowingly overbilling and supplying inferior quality goods.3 The fraud cases grabbed the public attention for three primary reasons. First, enormous sums of money were in-volved.4 Second, the nature of the fraud often posed a direct danger to United States troops, potentially compromising "national security."5 Finally, large contractors, perceived as the perpetrators of the fraud, were apparently going unpunished. 6 In response, Congress passed the Major Fraud Act of 1988 ("the Act").7 Congress intended the Act to "provide federal prosecutors with an additional criminal statute targeting majo r procurement fraud committed against the United States." 8 As a general matter, prosecu tion under the Act is limited to "major fraud": instances where the value of the contract exceeds $1,000,000.9
A substantial portion of all federal government expenditures is paid to contractors. For example, the Defense Department alone spends more than $200,000,000 annually on contractors, accounting for fourteen percent of all federal spending in 1997.10 As in the private sector, prime contractors -the party that has privity with the ultimate client, in this case the federal government -frequently enter into subcontracts. In those cases, subcontractors perform services or supply or manufacture goods for the government.
The role of the subcontractor includes a range of functions from supplying components to be included in a final product or providing some service to the prime contractor, to performing essentially the en tire prime contract. In the latter case, the prime contractor's role may 4. See Elizabeth Tucker, Two Contractors Ta rgeted in Defe nse Fra ud Probe, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1986, at D14 (discussing two cases involving losses suffered by the govern ment on the order of $100 million).
5. See Eric Pianin, Fa ulty Parts Still Aboard Navy Ships; Sen. Nunn Calls Risk to Mili tary Personnel 'Outrageous,' WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1987 , at A21.
6. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 100 (" We have documented ... quite a few ex amples of where we thought what I call some of the big boys got away."); Kathleen Day, Motorola to Plead Guilty to Fraud, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1988 , at Al6 (discussing a plea bargain under which the contractor paid fines but no individuals were prosecuted and the company was not barred from future contracts). The defense industry's dismissive attitude toward the issue also may have fueled the strong public and congressional reaction. 9. See 18 U. S.C. § 1031(a). The threshold was adopted, in part, to focus attention on large contractors who were not deterred by existing punishments. See H. R. REP. No. 100-610, at 5 (1988).
10. The Federal Page: Dividing Defe nse Dollars, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1998, at A23.
be limited to taking a fee or a markup and conducting contract ad ministration with the government.11 In 1996, defendants Edwin and John Brooks and their company, B & D Electric, appealed convictions under the Act to the Fourth Circuit.1 2 B & D Electric had fraudulently mislabeled and misrepre sented the specifications of components supplied to two United States Navy prime contractors.13 Although both prime contracts were valued at more than $1,000,000, B & D Electric's subcontracts were each val ued at much less than the statutory threshold. 1 4 Brooks contended on appeal that because B & D Electric's subcontracts did not exceed the $1,000,000 threshold, he could not be prosecuted under the Act.1 5
The Fourth Circuit rejected Brooks's claim. In performing a de tailed evaluation of the Act's language and legislative history, as well as policy concerns underlying the Act, the court held that the Act ap plied to cases where the prime contract, but not necessarily the spe cific subcontract, exceeded the $1,000,000 threshold.1 6 The court be lieved that this interpretation would enable prosecutors to combat the fraud identified by Congress more effectively. 17 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that its holding conflicted with the conclusion reached by the Second Circuit.1 8 In United States v. Nadi,19 the Second Circuit concluded that the Act did not apply if the specific subcontract under which fraud was committed did not exceed $1,000,000.20 The Nadi court also addressed the statutory language and legislative history of the Act and the policy concerns underlying the Act in reaching this decision. 21 Although the scopes of the analyses were similar, the two courts reached opposite conclusions.22 12. United States v. Brooks, 111F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1997).
13. See id. at 368.
14. The values of the two prime contracts were $9,000,000 and $5,000,000; the values of B & D Electric's respective subcontracts were $51,544 and $1,470. Id 20. See Nadi, 996 F.2d at 551. Because the value of the subcontract involved in Nadi did exceed $1,000,000, the conclusion was distinguished by the Brooks court, among other rea sons, as dicta. Brooks, 111 F.3d at 369. The Second Circuit, however, did explicitly adopt the rule: "[A] reasonable reading of the statute, in light of the legislative history, requires that we adopt the rule ... whereby the value of the contract is determined by looking to the spe cific contract upon which the fraud is based." Id. 21. Id. at 551-52. The Supreme Court of Connecticut also implicitly adopted the Nadi interpretation by assuming that the value of a procurement contract exceeded $1,000,000
This Note adopts the Fourth Circuit's position and argues that courts should read the Act to impose liability on contractors and sub contractors when the value of the prime contract exceeds $1,000,000, even if the subcontract itself is less than $1,000,000. Part I of this Note examines the statute and concludes that both the specific text on li ability and the statute taken as a whole support liability for "low value" 23 subcontractors. Because the mere existence of the disagree ment between the circuits suggests some ambiguity in the statute itself, Part II examines the legislative history of the Act. It concludes that Congress knew the Act would apply to low-value subcontractors and, more generally, was openly hostile to business groups' efforts to limit the scope of the Act. Part III discusses the benefits of judicial and prosecutorial clarity as well as the symbolic value of use of a statute specifically tailored to the crime of contract fraud, and counters argu ments that prosecution of low-value subcontractors is unfair. The Note concludes that these arguments support prosecution of low-value sub contractors and accordingly recommends that courts adopt the Fourth Circuit's position when faced with this issue in the future.
I. FIRST THINGS FIRST: THE STATUTE
This Part examines the statute from two different perspectivesthe specific text prescribing liability and the Act as a whole -and concludes that the Act extends to subcontractors and imposes liability when either the prime contract or the subcontract exceeds $1,000,000.
A. The Statutory Limit on Liability
Statutory interpretation begins with the text of the statute,24 and the text here should be read as imposing liability on low-value subcon tractors. The statutory language prescribing liability reads:
Whoever knowingly executes ... any scheme or artifice with the intent to defraud the United States ... in any procurement of property or services when holding that discharging an employee who resisted participation in the fraud violated public policy. See 23. This Note will use the term "low-value " to refer to contracts or subcontracts under $1,000,000. This Note assumes that the prime contract with the United States is valued at more than $1,000,000 unless otherwise noted.
24. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U. S. 681, 685 (1985) ("It is axiomatic that '(t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.' " (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
as a prime contractor with the United States or as a subcontractor or supplier on a contract with the United States, if the value of the contract, subcontract, or any constituent part thereof, for such property or services is $1,000,000 or more shall ... be fined ... or imprisoned . . .. 25 A simple reading of this language leads to the conclusion that any con tractor, subcontractor, or supplier who commits fraud can be liable if any component of the contract exceeds $1,000,000. 26 Because the stat ute reads "any constituent part,"27 satisfaction of the dollar threshold need not be achieved through the fraudulent actor's own contract.28 Furthermore, the statute's use of the word "or" within the list of par ties who are potentially liable indicates an intent to include all such parties as potential defendants.
This reading of the statute also accords with the canon of interpre tation requiring that the statute be interpreted so as to give effect to each word of the statute. 29 At first blush, one might argue that an in terpretation that relies only on the value of the contract and ignores the subcontract reads out the term "subcontract" from the statutory language. J o To say that any prime contract with a value over $1,000,000 satisfies the threshold yet the value of the subcontract does not matter seems to leave the latter term meaningless. J 1 Accordingly, this argu ment suggests that, to comport with the canon of construction, low value subcontractors should not be covered by the Act. The term "subcontract," however, does have meaning when a subcontractor is awarded a subcontract valued at more than $1,000,000 by a prime con tractor who itself does not hold a $1,000,000 contract directly with the government. As the court explained in Brooks: [I]f a prime contractor had entered into three separate contracts, agree ing under each to supply the United States with $750 ,000 worth of equipment, but entered into a single supply contract with a subcontractor for $1 million worth of parts, the subcontractor would be covered by the Act.J2 31. This follows from the seemingly reasonable, though incorrect, assumption that the value of the subcontract must always be less than that of the prime contract.
32. Brooks, 111 F.3d at 370.
Although perhaps unusual, the circumstances described by the Brooks court give effect to all the statute's language. 33 Although the Second Circuit found that the only relevant contract value was that of the contract under which the fraud occurred,34 its in terpretation depends on logic flawed by reliance on unpersuasive defi nitions of statutory terms. The primary basis for that court's interpre tation was the conclusion that the phrase "if the value of the contract, subcontract, or any constituent part thereof" tracks the preceding phrase, which reads "as a prime contractor with the United States or as a subcontractor or supplier on a contract in which there is a prime contract. ... "35 In sum, the Second Circuit interpreted this language to mean that "where the prime contractor is accused of fraud, we look to the value of the prime contract, but where the subcontractor is ac cused of fraud we look to the value of the subcontract, and where the supplier is accused of fraud we look to the value of the related con stituent part of the contract."36 Closer examination, however, reveals that the two phrases should not be interpreted to have tracking, or parallel, structures.
The primary error in this interpretation is that it improperly as sumes mutual exclusivity among the three terms in each series. In other words, the Second Circuit assumes that a contractor is not a sub contractor is not a supplier, and a contract is not a subcontract is not a "constituent part." The terms "supplier" and "constituent part," how ever, do not unambiguously exclude the other terms. Rather, both the general meaning and the trade usage of the language suggest that con tractors, and certainly subcontractors, are "suppliers."37 Similarly, a subcontract is not plainly distinct from a constituent part, and the in clusive interpretation of "constituent part" is further emphasized by 33. Moreover, the legislative history reveals that such circumstances are not merely a post hoc contrivance to give effect (artificially) to the language but rather were explicitly intended by Congress to be subject to the Act. See the word "any."3 8 Most strikingly, no standard or trade definitions suggest correlation of a "constituent part" to a "supplier," as is vital to the Second Circuit's construction. 39 The loose and overlapping definitions of these terms fulfill the purpose of creating broad coverage of the law,40 but are not compati ble with an attempt to define precise, tracking definitions.41 Because the Second Circuit used flawed logic to determine that the contract subcontract-component part series tracked the contractor subcontractor-supplier series, other courts should not follow the re sulting conclusion that only the subcontract value is dispositive with respect to subcontractor liability. Instead, courts should adopt the more straightforward reading of the Fourth Circuit, which follows the text by simply looking at the value of "any" part.
B. The Statute as a Whole
In addition to the specific text at issue, a broader examination of the statute supports the conclusion that the Act should apply to low value subcontractors.42 This Section examines three issues concerning the larger contours of the statute: the magnitude of the fraud, the stat ute of limitations, and the target of the fraud. It concludes that these broader themes support application not only to prime contractors, but to low-value subcontractors as well.
The Act does not look to the magnitude of the fraud when estab lishing liability.43 Rather, it looks to the value of a contract.44 Thus, while a potential objection to the Fourth Circuit's broad interpretation is that it is unfair to subcontractors because the magnitude of the fraud may be small,4 5 on its face the Act applies to all prime contractors with $1,000,000 contracts, regardless of the magnitude of the fraud.4 6 Congress did require looking to the magnitude of the fraud in portions of the Act that address damages, showing that consideration of the magnitude is important in some instances.47 The threshold question of liability, however, is not such an instance.48 While applying the Act to cases where the size of the fraud is small may appear harsh, it is undis puted that the Act applies to prime contractors in such cases, and there is no justification to treat subcontractors differently. 49 The importance of the contract value rather than the fraud value is demonstrated by the facts of United States v. Sain.50 In Sain the defen dant committed fraud by using less expensive regenerated carbon in a water treatment plant constructed and operated for the Army after specifying that it would need to use more expensive virgin carbon.51 Supplying this carbon was not included in the original $5,000,000 con tract, and so was addressed in a series of three contract modifications, each for $27,500, in which Sain charged the Army for virgin carbon.52 The Third Circuit held that, even though the component part (the modification) was less than $1,000,000, the modifications did not stand alone but were incorporated elements of the prime contract; thus, the Act applied based on the value of the prime contract.53 These facts parallel the subcontractor situation in which a low-value component part is attached to a prime contract.
Another aspect of the Act that supports its application to low value subcontractors is the extended statute of limitations. The Act grants a seven-year statute of limitations for prosecutions,54 and the rationale for an extended statutory period applies to fraud by subcon tractors as well as by prime contractors. The longer statutory period differentiates the Act from other statutes that could be used to prose cute fraud,55 such as the False Claims Act,56 the False Statements Act,57 and the federal anti-conspiracy statute,58 all of which are subject to a five-year limitations period.59 Congress extended the statutory period in response to perceived complexities of major fraud investigations.60 Therefore, one might incorrectly assume that applying the Act to . "simple" subcontractor cases might not be appropriate.
Investigating subcontractor fraud, however, may be just as com plex as investigating prime contractor fraud. Low-dollar fraud may be easier to hide within the bulk of a large prime contract. Likewise, while large contractors typically have nominal institutional systems to detect fraud by their employees, 61 fraud by small subcontractors may more often be instigated at the highest levels of the company.62
Even if not all investigations are complex, Congress's finding that some prosecutions require lengthy investigations does not mean that all prosecutions must be complex. The Act undisputedly applies to cases of prime contractors committing small frauds, whether difficult to discover or not. Again, there is no reason to create a special inter pretation for subcontractors.
Moreover, fraud by both prime contractors and subcontractors hurts the intended beneficiary of the Act, the United States govern-54. 18 U. S. C. § 1031(f) (1994). Indeed, the Act is often the last resort for prosecution when other counts have been time-barred. See ment.63 Even if a subcontractor commits the fraudulent act, the loss induced is likely to fall eventually on the government via the prime contract. For example, in United States v. Spring Works, Inc., 64 sub standard springs provided by a subcontractor were used in helicopters, cruise missiles, fighter jets, and the space shuttle. The cost to the gov ernment to correct the problems was estimated to be over $1,500,000.65 The subcontract value, however, was reported to be only $160.66 The adverse effects to the United States are severe whether a prime con tractor or subcontractor commits the fraud. By compromising the exe cution of a high-dollar-value contract, subcontractor fraud is equally "major" from the perspective of the United States.
II. P OLITIC S A S U SUAL: T HE L EGI SLATI VE H IS TO RY
Although Part I demonstrates that the Act's text standing alone supports application to low-value subcontractors, the existence of a split of authority suggests that the text may not completely resolve the question. In cases where the language itself is ambiguous, the Supreme Court has recognized the validity of seeking guidance from the legisla tive history.67 From another perspective, legislative history manifests the intent of Congress.6 8 Whether couched in terms of resolving ambi- 67. E. g., Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 508-09 (1981) (" We begin by considering the extent to which the text ... answers the question before us. Concluding that the text is ambiguous ... we then seek guidance from legislative history .. .. " ).
68. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 158 n.3 (1981) ("Absent a clear indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the statutory language controls construc tion.").
The modern trend is for courts to look to the statutory language above the intent of the legislature as indicated in legislative history to assess statutory meaning. See SINGER, supra note 42, § 48.02. Justice Scalia, in particular, strongly supports this view of interpretation:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with the context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress which voted on the words of the statute ... and (2) Part II of this Note examines the Act's legislative history and con cludes that Congress intended the Act to apply to subcontractors with low-value subcontracts on major prime contracts. Section II.A demon strates that, in drafting the Act, Congress specifically supported its ap plication to low-value subcontractors. Section 11.B asserts that amendments to the statutory language made in response to opponents' concerns did not change the underlying liability of subcontractors. Section 11.C gives further attention to specific language in the legisla tive history that was interpreted differently by the Second and Fourth Circuits.
A. Congress Recognized This Very Problem
This section asserts that Congress anticipated the Act's application to low-value subcontractors and was hostile to those who would ex empt such parties. Proceedings of the two House hearings conducted to debate the Act indicate Congress's desire to take a hard line on fraudulent.actors. The Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee held an initial hearing on the Act in December 1987.70 Witnesses at the December hearing included sponsors of the legisla tion, government prosecutors, government auditors, and public and ought therefore to be reined in by having its statutes construed strictly. I add now that such a view would be a form of judicial activism because it would cut down on the power of the legislative branch; and at this moment in history, we do not need more judicial activ ism. ").
Whether legislative history is consulted to "resolve ambiguity " or to assess "intent " may be a purely semantic distinction, for, after all, ambiguity can almost always be found if one looks hard enough. Cf Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 643 (Cal. 1968) (finding the belief of perfect verbal expression to be a "rem nant of a primitive faith " and allowing introduction of extrinsic, parol evidence in an expan sive set of contract disputes). This parallel between use of parol evidence and legislative his tory, and the trend to weaken the parol evidence rule in contract cases, have been used to argue for greater use of legislative history by courts interpreting statutes. See 72. See generally id. at 5-6, 149. The subcommittee chairman and sponsor of the bill, William Hughes, set the tone with his opening remarks: "In today's hearing, we will discuss a disturbing trend of successive scandals in procurements for spare parts, overhead charges, malfunctioning equipment and various other fraudulent schemes that bilk the American taxpayers of billions of dollars and at the same time diminish their confidence in the Execu tive Branch's ability to efficiently administer essential government functions." Id. at 5.
Similarly: "Simply put, when major fraud occurs, you need a major tool to combat it." Id. at 9 (testimony of Sen. Grassley). "We also welcome legislation which will enhance our prosecutive efforts and protect the government against those who would cheat or mislead it .... " Id. at 34 (testimony of John Keeney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General). "H.R. 3500 is a major effort which we welcome in support of our mission of detecting and investi gating fraud, waste and abuse within the postal service." Id. at 43 (testimony of Donald Davis, U.S. Postal & Inspection Service). "I share the concern of you and our fellow taxpay ers about white collar crime in the government contracting environment and, consequently, welcome any efforts to prevent it or impose stiff penalties on the perpetrators." Id. at 89 (testimony of Fred Newton, Defense Contract Audit Agency). "(S]o I hope that the commit tee efforts beyond this bill ... is the kind of thing where ... you lead the charge in saying to the Department of Justice we want to know why these large defense contractors got away with this." Id ("For example, a small construction firm could be paving a driveway for a large government office building. The subcontract could be less than $10,000 out of a $20 million contract for that building. If it is guilty of mischarging $1,000 on its work, it could be liable for a $40 million fine."). A similar scenario was raised by the Professional Services Council. See id. at 285 ("Thus, a subcontractor providing $50,000 in services under a $5 million prime contract could be ordered to pay as much as $10 million on a timesheet overcharge of $1,000."). At the time, the bill did not include a limit on fines. very issue of disagreement between the Second and Fourth Circuits addressed by this Note. As a general matter, the opponents of the Act wanted to tie application, sentences, and penalties, for both prime con tractors as well as subcontractors, to the magnitude of the fraud rather than the contract size.78 The opponents also asserted that (1) prosecu tion should require a showing of knowing and willful intent,79 (2) the Act would devastate small businesses,80 and (3) above all, the Act sim ply was not needed. 81 The Committee did not receive the opponents' testimony kindly,82 and its response demonstrates that it foresaw the possible prosecution of low-value subcontractors. The chairman specifically challenged the worst-case example posed by the Chamber of Commerce: "First, let me just ask you, Mr. Kipps, do you believe the Department of Justice would prosecute a subcontractor for a $1,000 mischarge on a $10,000 subcontract on a $20 million contract and ask for a $40 million fine?"83 In other words, the Committee, at least, understood that the govern ment could prosecute under the Act in such circumstances. Any deci sion to prosecute would be discretionary rather than limited by stat ute.84 While the magnitude of the fine or sentence; or even the likelihood of prosecution, might have been in question, the applicabil ity of the Act was not.
This direct and specific confrontation of the issue, moreover, should supersede any broad statement that could suggest a more nar row reading of the Act.85 One example of such a broad statement is contained in the Senate report, which states that the Act "would apply 83. House Hearings, supra note 1, at 312. Mr. Kipps, representing the United States Chamber of Commerce, stated that he did not think that it would, but feared that prosecu tors would abusively leverage the possibility during plea bargain negotiations. Representa tive Hughes responded that existing statutes also gave prosecutors the potential to wreak havoc with a corporation and challenged Mr. Kipps to provide examples of instances when the Justice Department had abused the process. Id. 84. The potential for arbitrary results stemming from prosecutorial discretion is miti gated by the equalizing effects of the U. S. Sentencing Guidelines. See infra Section IIl. B.
85. See Square D Co. v. Niagra Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U. S. 409, 420 (1986) ("Peti tioners have pointed to no specific statutory provision or legislative history indicating a spe cific congressional intention to overturn the ... construction; harmony with the general leg islative purpose is inadequate for that formidable task. " (citation omitted)).
to fraud committed in connection with a contract, or subcontract or any part of a contract or subcontract ... worth at least $1 Million." 86 Further, Representative McCollum indicated in the House debate that some limits exist within the Act: "We are talking now about procure ment contracts of $1 Million or more, very visible contracts, not the really tiny contracts with the Government." 87 Unlike the hearing de bate, these examples address neither the application of the Act to a subcontractor as opposed to a prime contractor nor the particular is sue of low-value subcontractor liability. Given the relative lack of specificity, these passages should be considered less persuasive.
B. Amendments to House Bills 3500 and 3911
Amendments made to the Act to protect small companies do not extend relief to low-value subcontractors because the amendments address penalties rather than liabilities and do not distinguish between prime and subcontractors. This Section examines amendments made to the bill's language during its passage. 88 These amendments demon strate that rather than limit application to subcontractors, Congress made last-minute modifications that resulted in greater application to subcontractors than what previously existed.
The earliest amendments to the bill demonstrate the House's de sire to expand, rather than limit, the effects of the Act and to tie li ability to the contract value. These amendments lowered the standard of proof and increased the maximum possible fine. Specifically, House Bill 3911, introduced in February 1988, removed the need to prove specific intent, 89 and also allowed the alternate fine to be "based upon double the 'value of the contract' rather than the 'object of the fraud.' "90
While other amendments made in April 1988 did provide relief to both contractors and subcontractors, they affected only the extent of damages, not subcontractor liability.91 The first significant amendment changed the maximum alternate fine under the bill from double the value of the contract to $10,000,000.92 The second "relief" amendment limited the situations under which the "whistleblower" reward could be granted.93 These provisions, especially the cap and limitations on the fine, do give relief to small businesses and are consistent with the recommendations of business interests.94 These amendments, however, do not distinguish between contractors and subcontractors. Nor did Representative McCollum's comment that the Act's objective was not to bankrupt small businesses95 suggest that he was more concerned about subcontractors than prime contractors.96 More importantly, the provisions address penalties but not liability.
Further amendments made by the Senate specifically recognized that the Act applied to subcontractors but did not distinguish between the liabilities of prime contractors and subcontractors.97 First, the Sen- ate Judiciary Committee modified the dollar threshold language from "if the value of the contract for such property or services is $1,000,000 or more"98 to "if the value of the contract, subcontract, or any con stituent part thereof, for such property or services is $1,000,000 or more."99 Later, the full Senate further clarified application to subcon tractors by adding an explicit reference: the language "in any procurement ... for the Government" was amended to read "in any procurement ... as a prime contractor with the United States or as a subcontractor or supplier on a contract in which there is a prime con tract with the United States."100 While other changes made by the Sen ate dull the teeth of the bill, the changes did not address the primary liability issue and gave no additional protection to low-value subcon tractors.101
C. Ambiguity in the Senate Report
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the disagreement between the Second and Fourth Circuits is the opposite interpretations of the same sentence of the Senate Report for the Act.102 The sentence is con tained in a passage attempting to clarify the meaning of the phrase "value of the contract." The Senate Report states:
Section 1031(a) applies to procurement fraud "if the value of the con tract, subcontract, or any constituent part thereof ... is $1,000,000 or more." The phrase "value of the contract" refers to the value of the con tract award, or the amount the government has agreed to pay to the pro vider of services whether or not this sum represents a profit to the con tracting company. Furthermore, a subcontractor awarded a subcontract valued at $1,000,000 or more is covered by this section, regardless of the 101. For example, one change reduced the maximum fine under the bill from $10,000,000 to $5,000 ,000. See H. R. 3911, lOOth Cong. Similarly, another change required that the amount of any fine be proportional to the offense, and a third established a maxi mum fine of $10,000,000 for multiple-count prosecutions. See id. These changes affected the penalty magnitude, but not the reach, of the bill. The Senate limited the scope only by fur ther extending Representative Mc Collum's limitations to the alternate fine. Specifically, the amount-of-the-fraud threshold was increased from $250,000 to $500,000, and the endanger ment threshold was changed from a "foreseeable and substantial risk" to a "conscious or reckless risk" standard. amount of the contract award to the contractor or other subcontrac tors. 103 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the "Senate report explanation supports the interpretation that the statute applies to the entire pro curement effort where any contractual component has a value of $1 million or more."104 On the other hand, the Second Circuit read the same language and concluded that "the committee instructs that, in the case of a subcontractor, the value of the subcontract is controlling and not the value of the prime contract or other subcontract. ... " 105 The Second Circuit interpretation, however, is unsupported by the legislative history as a whole and, accordingly, should not be fol lowed.106 Even before the Senate added specific subcontractor lan guage to the bill, both proponents and opponents assumed low-value subcontractors would be covered. 107 The legislative history is also re plete with examples where small subcontractors are the fraudulent ac tors.108 Congress specifically focused on small subcontractor cases such as Spring Works: "While these criminal schemes are often life threat ening and can have a disastrous effect on the ability of our troops to complete their mission, we have not received a significant sentence on most of these cases."109
The Senate Report's language that a $1,000,000 subcontract trig gers application of the Act regardless of the value of a particular prime contract is meant to clarify the Act's application to subcontrac tors that might be exempted if only the value of the prime contract was considered.U0 The record does not suggest that the report even considered the question of which agreement is "controlling" to be relevant. The report says merely that the subcontract value is adequate for application, but the Second Circuit's inference of necessity is not supported by the report. Moreover, reading the Senate's comment to narrow application of the Act is grossly inconsistent with the overall intent of Congress to develop an expansive, stand-alone statute to ad dress cases of contract fraud committed against the United States.111
Correctly, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation that the statute ap plies when the value of any contractual component exceeds $1,000,000112 is consistent with the Act's entire legislative history.113 The Fourth Circuit did not rely on an inference, but simply took the report at face value. Accordingly, this interpretation should be fol lowed by other courts in the future.
III . P OLICY I MPLICATIONS: W HY Do I T THE H ARD W AY ?
This Part argues that prosecution of low-value subcontractors un der the Act is desirable because it facilitates fair and efficient prosecu tions that send a clear symbolic message. Section III.A demonstrates that use of a statute that has been narrowly tailored toward fraud by government contractors is preferable because its use is more straight forward and efficient than are other potential means of prosecution, even if some redundancy exists. Moreover, as argued in Section III.B, equalization of penalties caused by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines negates arguments that the Act should not apply to subcontractors be cause of severe and disproportionate punishments.
A. Superiority of a Stand-Alone Statute
Use of the Act in this context is desirable because of benefits in herent in a narrowly tailored statute. Specifically, application of the Act enables straightforward and efficient prosecutions and allows utilization of a statute that has been tailored toward fraud in a con tract setting.114
Congress recognized these benefits during the legislative develop ment of the Act. During Senate hearings, the Justice Department identified the creation of a general fraud crime as, in itself, reason to support the Act.115 The Department pointed to the benefits of a similar 115. See Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 60 ("There are really five significant provi sions in this piece of legislation .... The first is the creation of the general fraud crime in the stand-alone statute, the Bank Fraud Act, passed in 1984.116 The Department asserted that the Bank Fraud Act had "facilitated and simplified the prosecution of hundreds of cases throughout the coun try."117 Based on this observation, the Department recommended that Congress consider enacting the general fraud provision of the Act as a stand-alone felony and that the $1,000,000 contract threshold apply as a trigger not for prosecution but for enhanced penalties.118
Members of Congress also recognized these benefits. Indeed, crea tion of a free-standing statute was identified as one of the main pur poses of the Act.11 9 Representative Hughes noted, "At the present time ... [w]e have to shop around. Can we put it within mail fraud? Can we put in within wire fraud? ... We have no free-standing fraud statute as such."120 Similar motivation and desire for a stand-alone statute were evidenced when Congress passed the earlier Bank Fraud Act.121
The primacy of laws targeting specific, as opposed to general, kinds of criminal activity is also reflected in courts' interpretations of con flicting statutes. The Supreme Court has concluded that a specific policy embodied in a later statute should control over an older, more general statute.122 Similarly, a canon of statutory construction dictates that, wherever a conflict exists, the more specific law should prevail over the more general.1 23 While these holdings deal with cases of con flict, the logic reflects the conclusion that the law that more precisely addresses the issue better reflects legislative policy than does a law that is merely peripheral. 119. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 311 (statement of Rep. Hughes) ("One of the criticisms leveled by the panel of H. R. 3911 is that it will not increase the number of fraud cases. It is not the purpose, really, of this bill to do that. The purpose is to deter. And in the second place, to provide a freestanding statute that will cover acts of fraud against the United States Government ... . "). Moreover, Congress passed the Act also to send a symbolic mes sage of no tolerance for fraud against the government, even if the Act was redundant with pre-existing statutes. One argument that could be made against applying the Act to low-value subcontractors is that other statutes could also be used to punish wrongdoers. This argument applies indiscriminately to both prime contractors and subcontractors, and the mere existence of alternative statutes that could serve as the basis of prosecution does not mean that the Act should not apply.
The )), to strengthen civil deterrents. These provisions raised civil and criminal penalties for violations involving fraud and false claims, provided protection for "whistleblowers," and strengthened provisions relating to qui tam suits involving government fraud. See Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 10; House Hearings, supra note 1, at 9, 10, 192. Moreover, independent of judicial sanctions, government contrac tors can be debarred from future contracts. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 126-30.
131. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32 (Vernon 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.280 (1991) (specifying penalties for any person convicted of "a ny gross fraud or cheat at common law"). While opponents of the Act did look to the availability of alternative federal statutes, the presence of state criminal statutes was not invoked during committee testimony. As a general matter, a federal issue would seem to be involved when the federal government is the target of the crime and the appropriateness of federal legislation was not debated.
132. The court in United States v. Brooks did believe that the Act was necessary to effectively reach such parties:
We believe that our reading of the statute is no more anomalous than one which allows small subcontractors to escape prosecution under the provision . Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 84-85 (1997) (discussing a category of laws they call "symbolic statutes " that are not truly instrumental but rather express who we are as a society).
139. Large contractors do have greater political and economic power than do low-value subcontractors. Representative Hughes stated in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee that the ongoing procurement scandal in 1988 "suggests ... that our current Federal statutes are not providing a sufficient deterrent. " Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 25. Hughes and other members of Congress reached this conclusion based on findings that many large contractors simply had too much power to be punished adequately under the existing law. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 100. Similarly, because the biggest contrac tors hold such a large share of the market, deterrence through debarment may not be effec tive. See id. at 130. Representative Hughes remarked, "I find that the small contractors are being dealt with very harshly but the larger ones are basically being restored. General Dy namics is a good example since they were restored within five months." Id. These arguments of redundancy and lack of necessity were raised by opponents to the Act before its passage, and were simply rejected by Congress. Regardless of the sympathy that smaller businesses tend to attract, even those that are fraudulent actors, the rationale sup porting a stand-alone statute is just as strong when applied to subcon tractors as to any other fraudulent actor.
B. Equalization of Punishment
Arguments that the Act should not be applied to low-value sub contractors because the magnitude of the penalty will be unfair also are not persuasive. Although Congress intended the Act to carry heightened penalties, the subsequent enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines creates punishments that are, by design, pro portional to the magnitude of the offense.140
Although the language and history of the Act direct that it should be applied to cases of low-value subcontractor fraud, some courts may still consider prosecution to be unfair.141 Similarly, some courts may be hesitant to allow prosecution under the Act if the penalty is perceived to lack proportion to the offense.142 This perspective stems from the observation that a mode of punishment necessary to deter large cor porations and contractors may not be necessary, and thus is not ap propriate, with respect to small businesses. Congress passed the Act as a means to reach wrongdoers who may not have been adequately de terred by the pre-existing penalties,143 and thus one might think that heightened penalties may not be justified as applied to smaller entities.
As discussed above, contract fraud potentially may also be prose cuted under a variety of other statutes.144 Statutory instruction on im prisonment and fines is limited under the various alternative stat- Although the statutory language of the False Claims Act, False Statements Act, Mail Fraud Act, Wire Fraud Act and the Major Fraud Act differ in some respects, all of the acts require that penalties be de termined in accordance with section 2Fl.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines related to fraud and deceit.147 While the conspiracy statute does not explicitly reference section 2Fl.l, section 2Xl.1 links cases of conspiracy to the underlying substantive violation of fraud.148 Unlike the threshold provision of the Act that ties application to the value of the contract,149 punishment -both fines and imprisonment -under the Guidelines depends primarily on the amount of "loss."150 In other words, the punishment is intended to be proportional to the harm caused by the offense.151
Defining loss under the Guidelines is itself a disputed issue.152 The application notes (which are guidance materials prepared by the Sentencing Commission that accompany section 2Fl.1), however, con tain specific instructions with respect to contract fraud and indicate that loss includes consequential damages:
[L]oss in a procurement fraud or product substitution case includes not only direct damages , but also consequential damages that were reasona bly foreseeable. For example, in a case involving a defense product sub stitution offense, the loss includes the government 's reasonably foresee able costs of ma king substitute transactions . . . . Similarly . . . loss includes the reasonably foreseeable administrative cost to the govern - 151. This aspect of proportionality was one of the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1994, which sought to minimize differences in punishment for the same underlying con duct. See 179 (1995) . This dispute will af fect sentencing regardless of whether the Act or an alternative statute is used. loss exceeded $40,000,000 and the fraud involved a conscious or reck less risk of serious bodily harm. 160 The effects of the Guidelines on fines similarly prevent punish ments under the Act that might be considered unfair. Section 2F1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual does not contain special rules re garding fines, and thus fines are determined following the general Guidelines rule.161 With respect to organizational defendants, base fines may exceed $20,000,000, and these base fines may be further multiplied under the Guidelines.162 Given the Act's limit of $10,000,000, fines of organizational defendants under the Act may ac tually be limited compared to alternative statutes that simply provide for fines "under this title."
The situation is somewhat different for fines for individual defen dants. While maximum fines for individuals are normally $250,000,163 that maximum does not apply if, as in this case, the statute authorizes a greater maximum fine.164 Notwithstanding the standard limit, how ever, another section of the criminal code provides for an alternative maximum fine of twice the gain or loss associated with a fraud,165 and this alternative maximum is available in prosecutions using alterna tives to the Act. A fine exceeding the normal maximum of $250,000 would be available under the Act and would be appropriate given the listed factors166 only in circumstances in which a large loss was suf fered. These same circumstances would also allow fines that exceed $250,000 based on the section of the code allowing for fines based on the amount of loss or gain, even without the statutory maximum pro vided by the Act. The Act's heightened maximum fine provisions, therefore, have little effect when compared with the alternative law.
In sum, the punishment a wrongdoer receives will be equivalent whether prosecuted under the Act or an alternative statute. Therefore, objections to prosecution based on a concern over disproportionate punishment are not persuasive. make the news.173 Whether a particular bad actor happens to be the prime or subcontractor should not limit the ability of the United States to prosecute under the Act.
